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THE REVOLT AGAINST THE DOLLAR AND 
TOWARD A NEW INTERNATIONAL 
MONETARY SYSTEM
An economist who has lived,  and worked both in Europe and the United States unveils 
some of the mystiques surrounding international monetary issues.
Dr. Gabriel P. Racz 
Memphis, Tennessee
The action taken by five West European 
countries (West Germany, Switzerland, Bel­
gium, Holland, and Austria) in May 1971 to 
“appreciate” the value of their national curren­
cies relative to the U.S. dollar, and thereby in 
fact “depreciate” the value of the dollar, sig­
naled the beginning of the end of the inter­
national monetary system set up in the closing 
days of World War II (1944 Bretton Woods 
Conference). From 1944 until 1971 the dollar 
had the role of anchor currency of world trade 
and finance. The announcement by the Presi­
dent of the United States on August 15, 1971 
that the United States would no longer con­
vert foreign-held dollars into gold gave official 
recognition to the demise of the old system.
The Development of the
Bretton Woods System
Preceding the present system, the so-called 
“gold standard” had reigned since before World 
War I; it collapsed under the impact of the 
world-wide Great Depression in the early 
1930’s. Under the gold standard, the relation­
ships of national currencies to each other (the 
rates of exchange) remained fixed, since the 
common denominator for all currencies was 
gold. For example, if one ounce of fine gold 
was worth 14.6 English pounds ( £ ), $35, 140 
German marks, or 175 French francs, the ex­
change rates for the currencies would be fixed 
at £ 1 = $2.40 = 9.6 marks = 12 francs. Gold 
was freely traded. At times, demand for gold 
exceeded its supply; at other times, supply ex­
ceeded demand. The fixed value of currencies 
was maintained by the generally accepted ob­
ligation of the Central Banks (the Federal 
Reserve in the U.S.) to buy gold if an excess 
supply developed (i.e., create gold reserves) 
and to sell from these accumulated gold re­
serves whenever the demand for gold exceeded 
its supply on the market. As the result of 
these Central Bank operations, only small fluc­
tuations occurred around the exchange rates. 
The price spread or fluctuation was determined 
by the cost of shipping gold between the 
various financial centers (London, New York, 
Zurich, Paris, etc.). Gold reigned supreme!
During the Great Depression, nation after 
nation was forced to abandon the gold stan­
dard. Evaluating the gold standard system, one 
must note its great advantage—the fixity of ex­
change rates and the associated ease and cer­
tainty of international payments. On the nega­
tive side, one must recognize the fact that a 
nation’s domestic money supply (increase or 
decrease) was determined by (1) the Central 
Banks’ compensatory actions on the gold mar­
ket and (2) the uncertain levels of yearly gold 
production. Domestic stabilization policies (i.e., 
monetary supply expansion in times of reces­
sion and monetary supply contraction in times 
of inflation) increasingly became primary na­
tional economic objectives. The stabilization 
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goals of the nations conflicted with the Cen­
tral Banks’ gold market operations, which were 
aimed primarily at maintaining fixed exchange 
rates.
The demise of the gold standard left a vac­
uum which was filled with some experimenta­
tion with freely fluctuating rates, flexible rates, 
and finally with exchange controls, which be­
came dominant from the mid-1930’s until Bret­
ton Woods. Under the controls, individuals and 
firms acquiring foreign claims were required 
to report them to the Central Bank. The Cen­
tral Bank retained the foreign currencies and 
paid the countervalue in the national curren­
cy. The Central Bank then rationed foreign 
currencies to importers and individuals in a 
very strict administrative and restrictive man­
ner. This practice led to a world-wide decrease 
in international trade and financial transac­
tions, to economic isolation, and often to open 
economic warfare among nations.
The hope and objective at Bretton Woods 
was to create a system which would avoid the 
undesirable aspects of previous approaches 
while capturing their best features. The main 
effects to be avoided were: (1) the rigid ex­
change rates and the associated deflationary 
side effect of the gold standard, (2) the insta­
bility of freely fluctuating rates, and (3) the 
repressive and distorting techniques of ex­
change controls.
The system which finally emerged from all 
these considerations at Bretton Woods became 
known as the “gold exchange standard”. True, 
gold still played a limited role in the new sys­
tem as reserves and as a computational point of 
reference. However, the stabilization operations 
of Central Banks were no longer conducted by 
buying and selling gold. Rather, currencies 
were stabilized in terms of their dollar values 
and Central Banks were no longer committed 
to redeem their currencies in gold. Only the 
United States maintained a commitment to ex­
change dollars held by foreign Central Banks 
for gold (at $35 an ounce). In reality, there­
fore, the U.S. dollar became the true standard 
against which the value of all other currencies 
was fixed. Herein lies the meaning of the often 
heard statement that “the dollar is as good as 
gold”. The dollar not only shared the spotlight 
with gold but, in fact, the U.S. dollar became 
supreme while gold was assigned only a sup­
porting role.
Sources and Uses of Foreign Exchange 
and the Balance of Payments
The United States acquires foreign exchanges 
(1) by exporting commodities,
(2) by exporting services (selling U.S. trans­
portation, services, receiving tourists, sell­
ing insurance policies to foreigners, etc.), 
(3) through inflow of foreign capital to the 
United States,
(4) by receiving unilateral transfers (gifts and 
grants to U.S. citizens from foreigners), 
(5) by selling gold for foreign currencies on 
the world’s money markets.
Export of domestically produced goods is 
the most important source of foreign exchange 
for all countries. Foreign exchanges so acquired 
are used by all countries 
(1) to pay for import of goods, 
(2) to pay for import of services, 
(3) to finance loans and investments in other 
lands,
(4) to make unilateral transfers to other coun­
tries,
(5) to pay for monetary gold acquired abroad.
The yearly systematic tabulation of a coun­
try’s international trade and financial transac­
tions is called the balance of payments state­
ment. The above listed ten main types of trans­
actions are classified into four categories:
Current Trade Accounts—which are further 
divided into merchandise trade (exports and 
imports) and service transactions,
The Capital Accounts—which include both 
long term and short term capital movements 
(inflows and outflows of capital),
Unilateral Transfers—which are subdivided 
into private and governmental transfers.
The Gold Account—which records the im-
“The accounting profession is currently considering whether leases should he 
capitalized and recorded on balance sheets as liabilities—a matter which touches 
on many fundamental objectives and complex principles of accounting. How­
ever, our experience suggests that the first step must be the establishment of 
acceptable measurement techniques and disclosure of the resulting lease obli­
gations. When these have been adequately tested in practice and understood 
by the financial community, the best method of presentation will probably 
resolve itself."
Kenneth S. Axelson, CPA
J. C. Penney and Company, Inc.
Financial Executive, July 1971
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port and export of gold.
Characteristics of the balance of payments 
statement are: (1) both trade and financial 
transactions are in terms of flows (in- and out­
payments from a country to the rest of the 
world and vice versa), (2) it is based on a 
double entry accounting system, and (3) the 
groups of items on the statement agree nu­
merically; that is, the statement is self-bal­
ancing.  
The information contained in the balance 
of payments is extremely useful if it is sub­
jected to analysis to draw out its significant 
implications. The reader should ask: In what 
manner and through what processes (trade, 
capital, transfer, or gold transactions) is the 
overall balance being achieved?
It is also necessary to recognize that in the 
free market economies of the Western World, 
foreign trade and financial transactions are 
freely carried out by individuals and business 
firms without government interference. These 
transactions are determined by such varied eco­
nomic factors as consumer preferences, the 
level and distribution of incomes, the prices 
of goods and services at home and abroad, the 
interest rates at home and abroad, and the 
foreign exchange rates relative to each other. 
The same economic factors operate in the other 
countries as well. The legitimate question can 
be asked then: How can one expect that the 
in- and out-payments will be equal? The an­
swer is that they will not be equal except by 
chance. Planned autonomous (ex ante) in-pay­
ments and out-payments do not equal, but 
actually realized (ex post) in-payments and 
out-payments do.
In the likely event that the planned inflow 
transactions of a country are not matched by 
its planned outflow transactions, there are two 
avenues available to bring the two into equal­
ity:
using gold reserves or accommodating trans­
actions
depreciating its currency.
In the first case, if a country has an incon­
sistent plan (for example: if it imports much 
more than it can pay for by exports), it may 
use its accumulated gold and other reserves 
and/or obtain foreign loans (accommodating 
transactions). In the second case, if a country 
lives beyond its means, the exchange rate on 
foreign currencies may rise (decreasing the 
value of the domestic currency relative to for­
eign currencies). The change in rates will make 
the cost of all imports higher, forcing a down­
ward revision in the country’s exaggerated im­
port plans. At the same time, the selling price 
of the country’s export goods abroad will be­
come cheaper for the foreigners purchasing 
them, thereby revising (upward) the original­
ly laggard export plans. The exchange rate of 
the country may continue to rise until the 
actually realized flows are in balance. (This 
is called adjustment through exchange rates). 
When planned autonomous in- and out-pay­
ments are not equal, a disequilibrium situation 
exists which may be a deficit disequilibrium 
(outflows exceed inflows) or a surplus disequi­
librium (the opposite).
A country experiencing an occasional deficit 
in the balance of payments need not be unduly 
alarmed since the cause may be extraordinary 
and non-recurring forces. However, continuous 
and growing balance of payments deficits are a 
serious problem, an indication of the country’s 
persistent disequilibrium situation. The three 
signs of a balance of payments disequilibrium 
are the growing presence of accommodating 
transactions, the market-induced rise in ex­
change rates, and the imposition of controls 
over international transactions.
Since in the Bretton Woods system the dol­
lar became the key or anchor currency of in­
ternational trade and finance, a highly sensi­
tive role was assigned to the United States 
economy and its currency. Therefore, the U.S. 
balance of payments statement must be care­
fully analyzed to understand the nature of 
changes which led to the present-day inter­
national monetary instability.
The Changing Character
of the U.S. Balance of Payments
The U.S. balance of payments displays three 
distinct stages of development from 1945 to 
date. The first stage, embracing the years 1946- 
1949, was characterized by huge balance of 
payments surpluses, the period of dollar short­
age. The second (1950-1957) was a transition 
period, characterized by small planned deficits. 
The third stage (1958 until today) shows per­
sistent, unplanned, and rapidly growing deficits 
and is sometimes called the period of dollar 
glut.
Table I summarizes the trade and accom­
modating transactions in the first period. In the 
immediate postwar years, the war-devastated 
economies of Western Europe were recon­
structed and rehabilitated. All the needed ma­
chinery, equipment, and even raw materials 
and food supplies could come only from the 
United States. To reduce substantially the re­
quired time for reconstruction of foreign econ­
omies, the United States adopted a variety of 
financial aid programs in the form of grants 
and loans. (The so-called Marshall Plan pro­
vided about $25 billion.)
Analyzing Table I, it is evident that the 
United States export (trade account) surplus 
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could not have been nearly so large without 
the grants and loans which the U.S. Govern­
ment extended to European countries which 
had no dollars to pay for their large import 
needs. It is correct, therefore, to say that the 
grants and loans were made as a result of the 
acute dollar shortage.
Table II summarizes the relevant data for 
the transition period of 1950-1957. The im­
proved dollar payments position of the world 
shows up clearly in the increase in dollar 
balances held abroad ($8.6 billion) and gold
TABLE I
U.S. Balance of Payments 
1946-1949 
(in billions of dollars)
Exports of goods and services 
(excluding military transfers)..........$67.0
Imports of goods and services..................... 35.1
Excess of exports......................................... $31.9
Means of financing excess exports:
Private capital (long and 
short term).............................$2.9
Private remittances ...................... 2.5
U.S. government financing: 
Loans ..................... $11.7
Grants (excluding 
military transfers) . 13.1 24.8
Errors and omissions.....................(3.1)
Total net financing............................... 27.1
Excess of export balance over financing. .$ 4.8
Means of financing surplus:
Liquidation of gold and other assets. .$ 4.8
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Survey of 
Current Business, various issues.
acquired by foreign countries ($1.7 billion). 
One could argue that not only had the dollar 
shortage ended, but its opposite, a dollar glut, 
was already starting to develop. Dollar glut 
refers to the presence of a balance of payments 
surplus for other countries vis-a-vis the United 
States, i.e. a U.S. balance of payments deficit.
The third period data are summarized in 
Table III. Since the current account displays a 
large surplus, it is clear that the $32 billion 
deficit was caused by the disproportionally 
huge size of the capital and unilateral transfer 
accounts. To put it another way, the deficit 
reflects the failure of the current account to
TABLE II
U.S. Balance of Payments 
1950-1957 
(in billions of dollars)
Exports of goods and services 
(excluding military transfers)...... $156.3
Imports of goods and services................. 134.4
Excess of exports......................  $ 21.9
Means of financing excess exports:
Private capital (net)*............ $10.8
Private remittances................... 4.7
U.S. Government grants 
and loans (net).............. 20.0
Errors and omissions.............. (3.3)
Total financing.................................... 32.2
Excess of financing over export balance. $ 10.3
Means of financing deficit:
Increase in foreign U.S. balances 
and short term claims (net)....... $ 8.6
Purchases of gold from U.S. (net)... 1.7
Total ......................................................$ 10.3
*U.S. capital outflow, less long term foreign in­
vestments in the United States
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Survey of 
Current Business, various issues.
TABLE III
U.S. Balance of Payments 
1958-1969 
(in billions of dollars)
Exports of goods and services 
(excluding military transfers)............$392
Imports of goods and services...................... 340
Excess of exports......................................... $ 52
Means of financing excess exports: 
Private capital (net)..................$26
Remittances and pensions............ 9
U.S. Government grants
and loans........................................ 38
Errors and omissions..................... 11
Total financing........................................ 84
Excess of financing over export balance. .$ 32
Means of financing deficit:
Increase in liabilities to foreigners, 
plus decrease in gold and foreign 
exchange reserves...............................$ 32
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Survey of
Current Business and Federal Reserve Bulletin 
(April, 1970), Table I, p. 316. 
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adjust fully to changes in the capital and uni­
lateral transfer accounts.
In analyzing the reasons for the failure of 
the U.S. balance of payments to maintain an 
equilibrium, one must note that:
1) The sheer magnitude of capital outflows 
was caused by the heavy investments of Amer­
ican business firms which set up operations 
abroad (primarily in the Common Market, 
England, and Japan).  
2) The non-economic (political and mili­
tary) considerations, such as military aid, 
NATO defense, etc., average $3 billion in the 
first five years and moved to nearly $5 billion 
in the latter years of the period.
3) The competitive price conditions turned 
against the United States, particularly after 
1965, when inflationary forces gathered mo­
mentum and kept on growing. Many American 
products were overpriced on the world market.
Not surprisingly, the export surplus (rela­
tive to total exports) began to decrease as 
noted above.
During the entire postwar period the bal­
ance of payments position of the United States 
seriously deteriorated. The long run trend 
shows that volume of world trade has ex­
panded faster than world production. While 
United States imports have followed this pat­
tern, its exports have not!
The Immediate Problem:
Restoring U.S. Balance of Payments
In the years 1970 and 1971 the U.S. bal­
ance of payments deteriorated even more seri­
ously. As the export surplus decreased rapidly 
(in 1970 the trade account surplus became a 
mere $0.4 billion), the size of the payments 
deficits became larger and larger. By the sum­
mer of 1971, a deficit in the United States trade 
account (trade deficit) developed for the first 
time in this century. The 1971 deficit is likely 
to be around $300 billion, and U.S. gold re­
serves have already dwindled to little more 
than $10 billion. The accumulated United 
States deficits in recent years, appearing as 
dollar surpluses on the balance of payments 
of U.S. trading partners, created a new prob­
lem. By mid-1971 some $50 billion of so-called 
“Eurodollars” were sloshing around in foreign 
money markets undermining the confidence in 
the U.S. dollar, the very foundation of the 
international monetary system.
In the most recent years, the values of cur­
rencies to each other became more and more 
misaligned. Under the Bretton Woods system, 
the rates of exchange were fixed (pegged) with 
only rare and infrequent changes permitted. 
The changing economic conditions in the 
United States and the rest of the world resulted 
in overvaluing the dollar and grossly under­
valuing the currencies of our trading partners, 
particularly those of France, West Germany, 
and Japan.
A more realistic realignment of the currency 
values to each other therefore became the first 
order of business in the fall of 1971. There was 
sharp disagreement between the United States 
and her ten largest trading partners in the 
Western World (the so-called Big Ten) as to 
how to go about it. The U.S. recommended 
an upward valuation (appreciation) of the 
undervalued currencies relative to the U.S. 
dollar, while the general desire of the Big Ten 
was a direct devaluation of the dollar.
When no agreement was in sight, the Presi­
dent of the U.S. on August 15, 1971 declared 
that:
1) foreign held dollar balances will no longer 
convert to gold and
2) a 10% protective duty on commodities 
imported to the U.S. would apply temporarily. 
Following months of hard negotiating, an 
agreement was finally reached in December 
1971 resulting in:
1) appreciation of the Western foreign cur­
rencies relative to the U.S. dollar by an average 
of 8.5 percent and
2) U.S. agreement that the German mark, 
French franc, and Dutch guilder will have no 
fixed rate but will find their values to the 
dollar on a “floating” basis determined by 
these countries’ demand and supply of dollars.
It was hoped that this agreed upon realign­
ment of currency values to each other would 
affect favorably the U.S. balance of payments 
since U.S. export goods would become less 
expensive and more competitive abroad while 
import goods became more expensive in the 
U.S. The expansion of U.S. exports and the 
shrinkage of U.S. imports were predicted to 
develop a U.S. trade surplus, eliminate the 
overall payments deficit, and restore inter­
national confidence in the dollar abroad; then 
a new and permanent international monetary 
system could be arranged.
The Prospects for the Future
The hopes attached to the December 1971 
agreement did not materialize. The U.S. trade 
deficit kept on growing; it amounted to over 
$500 billion in February 1972 and over $800 
billion in April 1972. It appears now that it 
will take a substantially longer time before the 
U.S. balance of payments deficit problem is 
solved. And solving this problem is a necessary 
prerequisite to setting up a new international 
monetary order to replace the defunct Bretton 
Woods arrangement.
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When the U.S. economic house is put in 
order and the confidence in the dollar abroad 
is restored, still another problem remains and 
will require solution jointly by all partners 
involved. This second problem arises from 
the fact that international trade among the 
Western countries expanded at a rate faster 
than financing ability (under the old Bretton 
Woods system tied to gold holdings) expanded. 
This was recognized by the international mone­
tary community. The International Monetary 
Fund (an agency of the United Nations in 
monetary affairs) devised as early as 1967 the 
so-called Special Drawing Rights (SDRs). Un­
like gold, SDRs arc merely bookkeeping entries 
in the special account of the International 
Monetary Fund—hence, the use of the name 
“paper gold.” SDRs arc used only in inter­
governmental transactions, and their supply 
is not dependent on the mining of gold, nor 
upon the holdings of the reserve currencies. 
They are created by the decision of the I.M.F. 
In 1970 about 3.5 billion SDRs were distrib­
uted among the member nations. After having 
acquired SDRs, a country is free to use them 
as the need arises to cover balance of payments 
deficits. The country may use its SDRs to buy 
needed foreign currencies from other members 
of the I.M.F. Member countries are willing to 
accept SDRs because of the certaintv that 
they can always exchange the acquired SDRs 
for other currencies.
The creation of SDRs (in fact a new “fiat 
reserve assets”) was an important first step 
toward the development of the concept of a 
“World Central Bank.” It is expected that the 
concept of this new reserve asset will play an 
important role in the new international mone­
tary system which must be created.
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TWENTY-FIVE YEARS AGO—
From "THE WOMAN CPA," June 1947
I think the most dangerous things in the world and the ones that have caused continual 
turbulence are the inequalities, the senseless, man-made inequalities that could be done 
away with—social inequality, economic inequality, race inequality, sex inequality—they 
mean not only unhappiness, but terrible waste. It may be suggested that after these in­
equalities are abolished, the real inequalities begin, and with that I agree. But the others 
are inherent inequalities which have always benefited the race—inequality of mind, of 
emotional powers, of strength, or of beauty. In our time it looks as if economic equality is 
the one we are first headed toward abolishing. But I believe, of all the inequalities, sex 
inequality may have caused the most waste.
—MARY COLUM, in "Life and the Dream." (Doubleday & Co.)
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